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Thus it may be that the inner nature of holiness…is here for the first time expressed in abstract 
terms and free from everything mythical, as denial of the will to live… 
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation  
The origin of ethics is that I think out the full meaning of the world-affirmation, which, together 
with the life-affirmation in my will-to-live, is given by nature, and try to make it a reality. 
Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics 
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INTRODUCTION 
 What I call “ethics-of-will” is that class of moral thought which contends that the essence 
of reality is the Will, that all that exists to our perception is phenomenal representation of the 
Will, and that ethical value is derived from responding to these unique metaphysical and 
ontological circumstances.  The central aim of this thesis is to examine ethics-of-will through an 
investigation of the philosophy of two of its greatest proponents, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-
1860) and Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965).  Ethics-of-will stands apart from other schools of 
ethical thought such as Hedonism, Virtue Ethics, Stoicism, and Utilitarianism, in that it rests on 
the two specific metaphysical assumptions listed above. Ethics-of-will is not strictly 
deontological as it does not take the form of moral law; yet, at the same time, the wisdom 
gleaned by the ethical subject upon the philosophical recognition of the world as Will does force 
one to obey a specific regiment of ethical action.  Ethics-of-will is consequentialist only insofar 
as the consequences of moral action relate to the theory’s particular metaphysical underpinnings.  
Like any subset of moral thought, its advocates, who remain faithful to many of the same 
philosophical contentions, advance ethical prescriptions which vary in their specific content.  I 
have chosen to focus on Schopenhauer and Schweitzer for this reason.  Although both 
philosophers see the world as Will and advance their ethics in response to this fact, they vary in 
their ethical prescriptions to such a degree as to place them as the representatives of the two 
extremes of ethics-of-will: a pessimistic ethics-of-will whose prescriptions seek to advance life- 
and world-negation, and an optimistic ethics-of-will which prescribes actions that advance life- 
and world-affirmation.  In discovering the point of divergence between these two extremes, I 
will shine an illuminating light on the nature of the broader moral school of ethics-of-will.  The 
power to motivate ethics latent within a philosophical understanding of the world as Will is, in 
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part, psychological.  At once, the student of Will is thrown into a world of incredible oneness.  
The divisions between the subject and the innumerable objects which comprise the world are 
suddenly exposed as arbitrary and superficial; one finds, immediately upon recognizing the will-
to-live as that which alone constitutes the essence of the world, that one’s being resonates in 
harmony with the being of the entire world.  From the physical forces that push and pull on dead 
matter, to the crystal which grows out of dark cave walls, to the grass and trees reaching out of 
the soil, to the insects and birds building nests for their young, to the increasingly complex 
beasts who walk upon the Earth, to, finally, the human subject itself—all is essentially one.  The 
psychological weight of this revelation can manifest itself in two ways: the subject will become 
overcome by optimism or pessimism.  The optimistic subject sees this world of oneness as a 
beautiful thing, a world in which the fundamental interconnectedness of all things gives life 
great positive meaning.  The subject’s ethical action reflects this optimism in that one seeks to 
make the world flourish just as the subject itself wishes to flourish.  The pessimistic subject can 
only see violence suffering in this world of oneness and, what’s worse, the violence and 
suffering comes from the Will and is directed at the Will itself.  The primal scene of a predator 
devouring its suffering prey, the dissonant cries of all representations of the same Will in vicious 
conflict, is, for the pessimist, the ill which ethical action must hope to alleviate.  As this thesis 
shall illustrate, each of our two philosophers will fall into one of these camps: Schopenhauer, in 
his pessimism, prescribes ethical action which seeks to negate the Will; Schweitzer, as an 
optimist, formulates an ethics-of-will which advances affirmation of the Will.  As such, their 
respective ethics-of-will echo this psychological discord between optimism and pessimism.  It is 
the express goal of this paper to understand how this discord comes about despite their identical 
metaphysical and ontological conceptions of the world. 
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 I begin this thesis by tracing the lineage of Schopenhauerian metaphysics, ontology, and 
epistemology to their Kantian origins.  In doing so, terminology vital to understanding ethics-of-
will, such as “Will” and “representation,” shall be expounded.  The role of the physical human 
body in Schopenhauerian philosophy, which is essential to the formulation of both 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and ethics, will be explained.  Once the key terminology and 
philosophical contentions of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are understood, Schopenhauer’s 
ethics-of-will shall be described, once again using Kant as a foil.  In explaining Schopenhauer’s 
critique of the foundation of Kantian deontological ethics, the criteria for Schopenhauer’s own 
ethical foundations will be made clear.  Once Schopenhauer’s ethics have been shown to meet 
the criteria of ethics-of-will, I will clarify the meaning of language necessary to the 
understanding of Schweitzerian ethics.  The complex relationship between Schweitzer’s ethics, 
metaphysics, and philosophical world-view shall be shown to function holistically, thus 
allowing me to designate Schweitzerian ethics as ethics-of-will.  At this point, the critical 
comparison between the two ethics-of-will begins in earnest, as I designate Schweitzerian 
ethics-of-will as an ethical system which seeks to affirm the Will, standing in radical opposition 
to Schopenhauerian ethics-of-will which seeks to negate the Will.  Finally, the point of 
divergence between the two theories of ethics-of-will shall be explored and understood through 
looking both at the philosophers’ contrasting methodologies and unique perspectives on the 
Will.  In turning our gaze to the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Schweitzer, ethics-of-will as a 
specific subset of moral thought shall make itself known.  
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CHAPTER I 
FROM KANT TO SCHOPENHAUER: AN EXPLICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
The Copernican Turn 
 To properly understand the metaphysics of Schopenhauer, one must first look back to the 
metaphysics of Immanuel Kant.  Schopenhauer so deeply venerated Kant as to list him as his 
principle influence in The World as Will and Representation Volume I (WWRI), accompanied 
only by the works of Hindu philosophy and Plato (WWRI, 417).  Although Schopenhauer saw 
his philosophical “line of thought” as differing in its content from the content of Kantian 
metaphysics, he nevertheless recognizes his own metaphysics as “completely under its 
influence”; accordingly, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics relate to Kantian metaphysics in that 
Schopenhauer’s thought “necessarily presupposes and starts from it” (WWRI, 417).  In tracing 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics to their Kantian origins, I will explicate concepts vital to an 
understanding of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical and moral philosophy.         
 It was on his deathbed in 1543 that Nicolas Copernicus was finally presented with the 
complete printing of his life’s work, Dē revolutionibus orbium coelestium.1  Few scientific works 
have had such a transformative effect on the lay population of Europe that Copernicus’s 
heliocentric theory and the resulting mass transformation in religious-scientific-social thought 
are often declared the “Copernican Revolution” by historians of science.2  Slightly over two 
centuries later, Kant himself described the metaphysical discoveries of the Critique of Pure 
Reason (CPR) as, “analogous to the Copernican hypothesis,” that is, as philosophy’s symbolic 
                                                          
1 Eric Temple Bell, The Development of Mathematics (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications,1940), 111.   
2  The “Copernican Revolution,” as a specific term of scientific-philosophical analysis, at least dates back to a 1957 
book by Thomas Kuhn, the great historian of science, titled The Copernican Revolution, and has subsequently been 
used in both popular and historical-scientific discourse.  Kant himself never uses the term “Copernican Revolution,” 
though he does routinely employ the Copernican metaphor in describing his work. 
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embodiment of the Copernican turn (CPR Bxxii n.93).  It is the radical repositioning of the 
subject as it relates to the object of phenomenal experience in the Kantian philosophical schema 
that lends legitimacy to this analogy.  When explaining his doctrine of transcendental idealism, 
Kant summarizes one of the most important findings of his “Transcendental Aesthetic,” a finding 
Schopenhauer called “a real and great discovery in metaphysics” in The World as Will and 
Representation Volume II (WWRII), claiming that Kant’s proofs for it are “among incontestable 
truths” (WWRII, 32).  Kant claims that space and time are a priori intuitions of the mind and 
writes that “we have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited 
in space or time, and hence all objects of experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances.  
I.e., they are mere presentations that—in the way in which they are presented, viz., as extended 
beings, or as a series of changes—have no existence with an intrinsic basis, i.e., outside of our 
thoughts” (CPR A491/B519).  The true moment of the Kantian “Copernican turn,” the moment 
at which Kant ruptures the epistemological relationship between the subject and the perceived 
object considered dogma by rationalist philosophy, is the moment at which the epistemological 
relationship between the subject and the phenomenal object is inverted.  In contrast to 
rationalism, Kant contends that knowledge is indeed reaped from a posteriori experiences of 
external objects.  However, in contrast to empiricism, it is no longer that the external object gives 
form to the subject’s mental representations; instead, Kant finds that it is the subject with his 
forms of intuition and twelve epistemological categories who gives form to the external object of 
perception.  What here is called the “external object of perception” is, in Kantian terminology, 
called the “phenomenon.”  As phenomena are perceived through the subject’s forms of intuition 
and categories, they are objects of experience.  What exists outside of experience—that is, what 
exists of the object outside of human perception—Kant calls the “noumenon” or the “thing-in-
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itself.”  Accordingly, any epistemological relationship between the noumenon as an object of 
experience and the human subject is impossible.  Theoretically, a being most unlike ourselves 
could perceive the noumenon in the “positive signification,” or as an “object of nonsensible 
intuition”; in this case, such a being must possess a species of intuition Kant calls “intellectual 
intuition,” which he claims, “lies absolutely outside of our cognitive power,” and could be 
thought to belong to a “divine understanding” (CPR B307, 308, 145).  Thus, Kant holds that to 
speculate on the nature of the noumenon is a futile enterprise as it necessarily exists outside of all 
possible understanding.   
“Two Worlds” versus “Two Aspects” 
 In both Schopenhauer’s time and today, a debate in interpretation of Kant is concerned 
with whether Kant’s view is that the noumenon is a distinct metaphysical object (an object which 
exists outside of all possible human experience but, nevertheless, exists in and of itself) or 
merely a limit concept identified by Kant as the terminus of the subject’s epistemological 
relationship with the external world.  This debate is generally denoted as the “two worlds 
interpretation” versus the “two aspects interpretation.”3  According to “two worlds” theorists, 
Kant held the noumenon to be “the mind-independent external world,” where knowledge of the 
noumenon is knowledge of ultimate metaphysical reality.4  Schopenhauer may be categorized as 
a defender of the “two worlds interpretation,” as evidenced by his claim that “the distinction of 
the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and hence the doctrine of the complete diversity of the 
ideal from the real, is the fundamental characteristic of the Kantian philosophy” (WWRI, 418).  
                                                          
3 Paul Guyer defends the “two worlds interpretation” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant.  Henry E. Allison 
defends the “two aspect interpretation” in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.  Paul Guyer, The Cambridge Companion 
to Kant (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1992).  Henry E. Allison, Transcendental Idealism (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004). 
4 Tom Rockmore, “Fichte, German Idealism, and the Thing-in-Itself” in Fichte, German Idealism, and Early 
Romanticism, ed. Tom Rockmore and Daniel Breazeale (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2010), 9.   
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Schopenhauer further equates the Kantian division of the illusory phenomenon and the 
metaphysically real thing-in-itself with the Indian doctrine of Maya as espoused in the Vedas and 
Puranas which also posit the non-identity of the ideal phenomenon and real noumenon (WWRI, 
419).  Not only is the “two worlds interpretation” of Kantian Transcendental Idealism an obvious 
and incontestable truth for Schopenhauer, “the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-
itself” is “Kant’s greatest merit” and the may be considered the starting point of Schopenhauer’s 
own metaphysics (WWRI, 417).        
 Schopenhauer breaks with his contemporaries like Schelling, Fichte and Jacobi who 
claimed the noumenon could be known through intellectual intuition, a faculty they claimed to 
have discovered.5  Instead, Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that we do not possess the faculty of 
intellectual intuition and argues against any purported knowledge gained though “the vapouring 
of intellectual intuition” (WWRI, 419). As I will later explain, Schopenhauer also breaks with 
Kant in his belief that knowledge of the thing-in-itself is indeed possible, not through intellectual 
intuition, but through a faculty Schopenhauer dubs “immediate intuition.”  Yet, as a faithful 
subscriber to the “two worlds interpretation” of Kantian Transcendental Idealism, Schopenhauer 
still seeks to “retain the Kantian expression” of the distinction between the phenomenon and 
noumenon as he speculates on the nature of the noumenon (WWRI, 110).  His modification of 
Kantian Transcendental Idealism comes with a modification of language too, such that 
“phenomenon” becomes “representation” and “noumenon” becomes “the Will.”  Schopenhauer, 
in his critique of Kantian philosophy, writes that “it is true that Kant did not arrive at the 
knowledge that the phenomenon is the world as representation and that the thing-in-itself is the 
will,” indicating that Schopenhauer himself saw the complimentary terms as two linguistic 
                                                          
5 Dennis Vanden Auweele, The Kantian Foundation of Schopenhauer’s Pessimism (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2009), 18. 
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references which convey the meaning of the same philosophical object (WWRI, 421).  It is 
crucial to an understanding of Schopenhauer’s ethics and all ethics-of-will that these concepts 
are explicated in detail.   
Will and Representation  
 The philosophical concept of Will has a significant legacy in the Western philosophical 
canon, a legacy that, in Parerga and Paralipomena Volume I (PPI) Schopenhauer himself traces 
back to the works of Clement of Alexandria and Spinoza and was continuing in the works of his 
contemporaries like Schelling (PPI, 132-6).  However, the Schopenhauerian concept of the Will 
is unique in that it takes a central place in his philosophical project.6  Schopenhauer holds that 
the Will “is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world;” thus, the Will must be 
(on the “two worlds” interpretation of the thing-in-itself) the metaphysical ens realissium, the 
metaphysically real noumenal object which lies beyond all sensory perception.  Schopenhauer’s 
key ontological point is Will underlies all existence: “if the will exists, then life, the world, will 
exist” (WWRI, 275).  If the Will is the “first world” in the “two worlds” dyad, then the “second 
world” is the world of representation. 
 Although the Will is all that exists, this is clearly not how we perceive the world.  Indeed, 
Schopenhauer holds that it is necessarily impossible for beings like us to see the world as it 
exists in-itself, as Will, due to our lack of an intellectual intuition.  The Will, once perceived, 
becomes subjected to our mental faculty of sufficient reason and is given a definitive form in 
space and time.  Here, Schopenhauer remains faithful to Kant’s findings in the “Transcendental 
Aesthetic.”  Like Kant, Schopenhauer recognizes that time and space, which exist only as mental 
faculties, are the subject’s principium individuationis: through our mental faculties, the world is 
                                                          
6 Stephen Cross, Schopenhauer’s Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and Will and their Indian 
Parallels (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013), 103. 
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given the form of numerical diversity and temporal succession.  “That time and space belong to 
the subject,” and not to the objective world (that is, the Will as the thing-in-itself) is sufficiently 
proven for Schopenhauer through “the absolute impossibility of thinking away time and space, 
whereas we can very easily think away everything that appears in them” (WWRII, 33).  The 
world, perceived through our senses and given form through our mental faculties, is the 
phenomenal world, the world as mental representation.  The Will itself is “free” in the sense that 
“it is the thing-in-itself and the content of all phenomena,” whereas “the phenomenon, on the 
other hand, we recognize as absolutely subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason” and 
bound by the limits of our mental faculties of time and space (WWRI, 286).  The thing-in-itself 
is the Will; the phenomenal world, molded by the subject’s epistemological faculties, is mere 
representation of the Will. 
 The Will should not be thought of as an underlying property of an object which exists 
independent of human perception (like the feature of an objected denoted by Locke as “primary 
qualities”7).  It may more properly be understood as an underlying force (a term Schopenhauer 
often uses), though not a natural force like magnetism or gravity as they too are also phenomenal 
objectifications of the Will.  At certain points, Schopenhauer attempts to understand the essence 
of the Will, the essence of the thing-in-itself and thus the whole world, by exploring how it exists 
as represented phenomena in nature.  Schopenhauer claims that, due to our innate self-
consciousness, the highest level of the manifestation of the Will is phenomenally objectified as 
the human subject.  All other representations, including animal-life, plant-life, non-living objects, 
and natural forces are also objectified representations of the selfsame Will; thus, the Will must be 
                                                          
7 This is how Schopenhauer understands Locke’s primary qualities, writing that they are “qualities of the thing-in-
itself” (WWRI, 418). 
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that which is common to this diverse set of living and non-living representations.  When 
discussing how the Will animates plant-life, Schopenhauer writes,  
 therefore what appears for the representation as plant, as mere vegetation, as blindly 
 urging force, will be taken by us, according to its inner nature, to be will, and it will be 
 recognized by us as that very thing which constitutes the basis of our own phenomenon, 
 as it expresses itself in our actions, and also in the whole existence of our body itself.  It 
 only remains for us to take the final step, namely that of extending our method of 
 consideration to all those forces in nature which act according to universal, immutable 
 laws, in conformity with which there take place the movements of all those bodies, such 
 bodies being entirely without organs, and having no susceptibility to stimulus and no 
 knowledge of motive (WWRI, 117). 
 
On this basis, the Will may be properly understood as the “innermost essence, the kernel, of 
every particular thing and also of the whole,” such that “the force that shoots and vegetates in the 
plant … the force by which a crystal is formed, the force that turns the magnet to the North Pole 
… the force that appears in the elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, separation 
and union,” are all “the same according to their inner nature” (WWRI, 110).  This innermost 
essence, abstracted from all representations which make up the perceived world, is characterized 
by its fluidity, its constant changing, its unceasing movement, and its blind, non-teleological 
striving towards self-perpetuation.  
 As stated in Schopenhauer’s description of plant-life, the Will is without knowledge and 
motive; thus, it is without a telos.  Though knowledge and Will were thought by many of 
Schopenhauer’s rationalist contemporaries and predecessors to be inseparable— with many 
philosophers even holding that willing is contingent on knowing—Schopenhauer, in On the Will 
in Nature (WN), takes knowledge and Will to be wholly independent, with the former being 
“quite secondary and of a later origin” to the latter (WN, 20).  Schopenhauer held that knowledge 
and the conscious intellect were purely attributes of the physical brain and thus themselves 
11 
 
phenomenal representations of the Will.8  The Will not only logically precedes the intellect and 
knowledge, it also manifests itself phenomenally as so many mindless representations, indicating 
that the Will and knowledge are quite separate things.  Hence, the Will is characterized by a 
genuine knowledge-less mindlessness, setting Schopenhauer’s philosophy apart from the few 
pantheistic philosophers in the Western canon (e.g. Spinoza).   
 The mindless, aimless Will underlies instinctual impulses.  One of Schopenhauer’s 
favorite examples of how the Will manifests itself as an innate impulse is the reproductive drive 
common to all life and recognized as the sexual impulse in humans.  Schopenhauer identifies this 
drive as the most primal of all human desires and a clear indicator of the nature of the Will, 
writing that “the sexual impulse is the most vehement of all craving, the desire of desires, and the 
concentration of all our willing” (WWRII, 514).  Indeed, were the reproductive drive to be 
extinguished, all future life, and thus all future higher-level objectifications of the Will, would 
cease to be.  He considers the sexual impulse to be “the most complete manifestation of the will-
to-live, its most distinctly expressed type” (WWRII, 514).  Accordingly, the sexual impulse’s 
boundless drive towards self-perpetuation, as the archetypical manifestation of the represented 
Will, indicates that “the will, considered purely in itself, is devoid of knowledge, and is only a 
blind irresistible urge, as we see it appear in organic and vegetable nature and in their laws, and 
also in the vegetative part of our own life” (WWRI, 275).  The Will, though it has no knowledge 
or mind and thus no telos, once represented, manifests itself, in part, as an innate drive towards 
self-perpetuation ad infinitum.  Simply put, though the Will has no mind or definitive end, our 
instinctual impulses and the instinctual impulses of all life show that “what the will wills is 
always life” (WWRI, 275). 
                                                          
8 Y. V. Krutas. “The will-intellect relationship in A. Schopenhauer’s system of views: the influence of Indian 
philosophy,” Granì 19, no. 4 (2016): 28-33. https://doi.org/10.15421/1716074.  
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 It is important to note here a point that will become vital in the formulation of the 
respective ethics-of-will projects of Schopenhauer and Schweitzer: as all represented life is an 
objectification of the selfsame Will, all life-vs-life conflict is truly conflict directed at the Will 
itself, such that the Will wages war with itself through the mirror of representation.  It is for this 
reason that the Will may be described as autocannibalistic, self-consuming, and self-defeating.  
As we shall see, just how the self-conscious and ethically attuned human agent is to reconcile 
with this element of the Will is perhaps the key concern in formulating an ethics-of-will. 
Immediate Intuition  
 I have previously claimed that Schopenhauer breaks with Kant in his belief that 
knowledge of the noumena is possible.  This knowledge of the noumena reveals the nature of the 
Will as I have described it.  It is through a faculty Schopenhauer calls “immediate intuition” that 
the subject may come to know this nature of the Will.  The discovery of immediate intuition 
arises through Schopenhauer’s twofold ontological conception of the body.  The first way the 
body exists is as a physical object in the world.  As such, the body exists in space and time and 
has causal relationships with other physical objects in the represented world.  Schopenhauer 
writes that we have an intuitive perception of our body as a represented thing through the 
“consciousness of other things,” the same consciousness through which we gain an immediate 
awareness of other people and other spatiotemporal objects.9  Indeed, at least on the surface, it 
seems as if any part of my body exists just like any other object of my perception, existing in 
space and time and subject to causal powers external to my body.    
 The body differs from other objects of perception in a fundamental way, however.  We 
do not simply experience our bodies as phenomena known from “the outside”; we also have 
                                                          
9 David E. Cartwright, Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 
2005), 34.   
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access to knowledge of our bodies from “the inside,” so to speak, through a “self-consciousness” 
that allows us to differentiate our individual bodies from the totality of other objects.  Self-
consciousness affords the individual the ability to possess intuitive knowledge of himself as 
phenomenal will, that is, as the animating force behind his physical actions.  This, Schopenhauer 
claims, is the most immediate of all human knowledge, indeed, “the most immediate and 
intimate knowledge possible” (WN, 20).  In Parerga and Paralipomena Volume II (PPII), 
Schopenhauer writes that the knowledge gained from our willing is “neither a perception (for all 
perception is spatial), nor is it empty; on the contrary, it is more real than any other knowledge” 
(PPII, 306).  Our willing is unlike any other represented event in that “it is the one thing known 
to us immediately, and not given to us merely in the representation, as all else is”; each external, 
represented instance of our willing is simeltaneously known from within immediately through 
self-consciousness.10  Without the self-conscious conception of the body, any attempt to 
differentiate between the body and the other innumerable represented objects we continuously 
experience would be impossible as I would have “no sense of anything that I perceive as my 
body.”11   Schopenhauer goes even further, writing that, “the whole body is nothing but the 
objectified will, i.e., will that has become representation” (WWRI, 100).  It is only through 
reflection that willing and acting appear different; Schopenhauer illustrates that, in reality, they 
are numerically identical (WWRI, 100-101). 
 Our experience of our bodies in this binary way not only offers us a window into the 
binary world we inhabit (“The World as Will and Representation”), but also allows us to 
conceive of the thing-in-itself, the Will, in the Kantian sense of positive signification as an 
“object of a nonsensible intuition” (CPR B307)  Immediate intuition functions as the “key to the 
                                                          
10 G. Steven Neeley, Schopenhauer: A Consistent Reading (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), 5.  
11 Cartwright, Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, 15. 
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knowledge of the innermost being of the whole of nature” (WWRI, 109).  As a result, the thing-
in-itself, which Kant considered beyond the possible limits of the subject’s knowledge, could be 
immediately and intuitively conceived through the Schopenhauerian self-consciousness.  Once 
this immediate intuition is undertaken, the thing-in-itself reveals itself to be Will, a 
metaphysically real entity with the previously described characteristics which appears to 
perception as represented phenomena.   
 Now that the meanings of Schopenhauer’s key metaphysical concepts have been 
elucidated, we can begin a thorough investigation of his ethics-of-will.  As I will soon explain, 
his metaphysical conception of the Will as the thing-in-itself, the underlying noumenal essence 
of all things, will play a vital role in establishing his ethics as an ethics-of-will; likewise, his 
ethics-of-will also relies on the subject’s self-conscious conception of his body as phenomenal 
will.  As in the case of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and epistemology, Kant plays the role of 
Schopenhauer’s main foil as he moves to establish his own his moral philosophy.  I will first 
explain Schopenhauer’s critique of Kantian ethics before explaining the foundations, and 
ultimately the content, of Schopenhauer’s ethics.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
CHAPTER II 
SCHOPENHAUER’S ETHICS-OF-WILL 
Critique of Kantian Deontological Ethics 
 The purest distillation of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought is contained in his 1840 treatise 
On the Basis of Morality (BM).  The text was submitted as an answer to the The Danish Royal 
Society of Sciences’ prize-question: “Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for in an 
idea of morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and in the analysis of 
the other leading ethical conceptions which arise from it? or is it to be found an some other 
source of knowledge?” (BM, 1).  Famously, The Danish Royal Society of Sciences did not 
accept Schopenhauer’s answer or award him the promised cash prize even though On the Basis 
of Morality was the only essay submitted that year.  The contest’s judges claimed that 
Schopenhauer had failed to explain the connection between metaphysics, specifically the widely 
accepted Kantian version of Transcendental Idealism, and ethics (despite the fact that 
Schopenhauer included a lengthy appendix on the metaphysical foundations of his 
groundbreaking ethical thought).  The judges also claimed to have taken offense at 
Schopenhauer’s characteristically terse dismissal of his highly-praised contemporaries Hegel, 
Schelling, and Fichte.  Whether the essay’s rejection came as a response to Schopenhauer’s new 
set of metaphysical and moral thought or as retribution for Schopenhauer’s reputation as an 
academic rabble-rouser will remain the subject of scholarly speculation.  However, the 
subversive core of the text, and a part of the text which most certainly caught the ire of the 
judges, is the first half of the essay in which Schopenhauer reviews and rejects Kantian 
deontological ethics.  Kant, whose essay The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals was 
considered the standard-bearer of moral philosophy in 1840, held morality to be restricted to a 
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priori categories, detached from empirical and phenomenal considerations, and reached through 
the mind (not the “heart”).12  It is through the lens of these moral fundamentals that Kant 
discovers a moral law, naming his discovery the “Categorical Imperative.”13   The Categorical 
Imperative, naturally, takes the form of an imperative, a command.  This command is entirely 
unique in that it comes from no definitive commander but that mysterious voice called Reason 
which allows us to recognize our moral duty.  Reason in this sense is not merely the human 
actor’s innate rationality “but a command without any definite content, simply a form of the 
Law.”14   This command does not call on us to preserve or advance life and human well-being, 
nor is it driven by men’s feelings, desires, or practical goods.  In that the Categorical Imperative 
possesses no definite content and is merely the vacant form of the Law, it shows no concern for 
the pain and pleasure, the living and suffering, of the rational agents who answer its call.  Simply 
put, Kant believes that to act immorally is to act irrationally, thus betraying our moral duty and 
making some grave transgression of Reason.  Schopenhauer raises two major objections to this 
system of Kantian deontological ethics before offering his own moral philosophy.  
Understanding these objections and understanding the foundations of Kantian deontological 
ethics as contrary to the foundations of Schopenhauerian ethics-of-will generally shall only 
further our understanding of Schopenhauerian moral thought.  
 Schopenhauer writes that "the student of ethics as well as the philosopher generally must 
be content with the explanation and interpretation of what is given, and thus of what actually is 
or happens, in order to arrive at a comprehension of it" (BM, 52).  Thus Schopenhauer seeks, in 
                                                          
12 Richard Taylor, “Introduction” in On the Basis of Morality (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), 
xiii. 
13 Stjepan G. Mestrovic, “Moral theory based on the 'heart' versus the 'mind': Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's 
critiques of Kantian ethics,” Sociological Review 37, no. 3 (August 1989), 431. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954. 
14 Taylor, “Introduction,” xviii. 
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part, to move the foundations of ethics from Kant's realm of the a priori metaphysical (where 
Reason itself decries the content of the moral law) back to a realm of empirical philosophy.  This 
is not to say Kantian deontological ethics cannot motivate practical action visible to empirical 
observation; indeed, Kant himself offers numerous examples of how one would act if one where 
to do his duty and follow the Categorical Imperative.15  Rather, the ethical thought of 
Schopenhauer breaks with Kant in that the foundations of Schopenhauerian ethical thought are 
both an a priori ethical basis and a posteriori “what actually is or happens,” while the 
foundations of Kantian deontological thought are strictly and purely a priori metaphysical.  To 
sit in a walled-off classroom all day and speculate on abstract moral laws might be a fun game 
for philosophers to play, but, for Schopenhauer, all moral thought conducted in this way will 
forever remain a speculative game.  True ethical philosophy “consists of a pure, i.e. a priori 
knowable part and an empirical one” (BM, 61).  Kant’s mistake lies in his rejection of any 
empirical basis for ethics: “Accordingly, without any justification and any deduction or proof, 
that moral law is assumed as previously existing and moreover is said to be a priori knowable, 
independent of all inner and outer experience" (BM, 61).  As we shall come to see, this “inner 
and outer experience” plays a pivotal role in the creation of Schopenhauer’s ethics.  Hence, 
Schopenhauer’s first key objection to Kant centers on Schopenhauer’s disavowal of any form of 
ethics which rejects the empirical basis of morality while privileging a purely a priori basis.  
 Schopenhauer’s second objection is that Kant’s imperative form begs the question, that 
Kant assumes at the very outset of his moral philosophy that there is a moral law without 
offering any deductive proof.  Through a genealogy of the term “law,” Schopenhauer illustrates 
                                                          
15 For example, in “Chapter 2” of The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant lists four practical duties that 
follow from the Categorical Imperative: the duty to refrain from suicide, the duty to develop one’s talents, the duty 
to not make false promises, the duty to help others in need.  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals trans. H.J. Payton (New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), 74-114. 
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that “law” is used in two distinct ways: first, as in “human law,” or “a human institution resting 
on human choice or discretion;” second, as in “natural law,” or the metaphorical use of the term 
when discussing the mechanisms of nature (BM, 52).  Kant clearly thinks of moral law in the 
second case yet offers no empirical evidence which is necessary in describing such natural laws.  
Schopenhauer critiques Kant in that “He [Kant] therefore establishes his moral principle—and to 
this I wish to draw attention—not on any demonstrable fact of consciousness, such as an inner 
disposition, or yet on any objective relation to things in the outside world.  No!  This would be 
an empirical foundation.  On the contrary, pure concepts a priori, in other words concepts 
containing nothing at all from outer or inner experience and so mere shells without kernels, are 
to be the basis of morals” (BM, 62).  Precisely what this means is that the input of all human 
consciousness and the entire external world are deemed by Kant to be improper foundations for 
ethical philosophy, thus leaving the philosopher with “nothing on which to stand” except “a few 
concepts which are entirely abstract, wholly insubstantial, and likewise floating about entirely in 
air” (BM, 62).  Schopenhauer contends that these “abstract,” “insubstantial” foundations are not 
strong enough to carry the weight of “the law” as Kant understands it.    
Schopenhauer’s Foundations of Morality 
 In the place of the inadequate foundations of Kantian deontological ethics, Schopenhauer 
offers his own foundations of morality.  Ethical incentives, he proposes, “must be something that 
requires little reflection and even less abstraction and combination,” “something that, regardless 
of the formation of intellect, speaks to every man, even the coarsest and crudest,” and, 
“something resting merely on intuitive apprehension and forcing itself immediately on us out of 
the reality of things” (BM 120-1).  Schopenhauer further contends that every ethical system, each 
with unique prescriptions, attempts to meet the maxim “injure no one; on the contrary, help 
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everyone as much as you can” (BM, 92).  The altruistic demand of this maxim is met by those 
who practice justice and philanthropy, which Schopenhauer sees as the moral ends of action, and 
disregarded by those who practice egoism, which Schopenhauer sees as the immoral end of 
action.  In his section on the “Statement and Proof of the Only Genuine Moral Incentive,” 
Schopenhauer proffers nine axioms from which he will derive the ethical incentive, resting on 
foundations with the characteristics described above.  The key axiom is the third, which claims 
that the only thing which moves the will, as experienced a posteriori in human life, is “weal and 
woe,” which “signify ‘in agreement with or contrary to a will’” (BM, 141).  Schopenhauer often 
conflates weal with pleasure and woe with pain respectively, as in the instance where he writes 
“it is called pain when it is contrary to the will, and gratification or pleasure when in accordance 
with the will” (WWRI, 101).  From these axioms, Schopenhauer finds that, 
 the weal and woe which (according to premise 3) must, as its [ethics’s] ultimate object, 
 underlie everything done or left undone, are those either of the doer himself, or of 
 someone else who plays a passive part in the action.  In the first case the action is 
 necessarily egoistic, since an interested motive underlies it.  This is not merely the case 
 with actions we obviously undertake for our own profit and advantage, which are the 
 most usual, but is precisely the same whenever we expect from an action some remote 
 result for ourselves, either in this world or the next (BM, 142).   
 
 Schopenhauer believes that “egoism and the moral worth of an action absolutely exclude 
each other” as all genuine ethical action, and ethics generally, must in some way concern the fate 
of the other and satisfy the fundamental ethical maxim (BM, 142).   He further contends that the 
only genuine moral incentive, the only set of actions which contain moral worth, are thus acts of 
compassion, in which the weal and woe of the other are the motives of the action of the ethical 
subject, not his own weal and woe.  Compassion exists as one of three “fundamental incentives 
of human action” and as the only incentive which Schopenhauer believes holds positive moral 
value: “A) Egoism: this desires one’s own weal (is boundless). B) Malice: this desires another’s 
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woe (goes to the limits of extreme cruelty). C) Compassion: this desires another’s weal (goes to 
the lengths of nobleness and magnanimity)” (BM, 145).  Compassion therefore requires that the 
other becomes the ultimate and absolute object of my will in the same way that I usually am; 
accordingly, this supposes that I suffer directly with the other, that “I feel his woe just as I 
ordinarily do only my own,” and that I desire his weal “in the same way I otherwise desire only 
my own” (BM, 143).   
 While Schopenhauer’s discovery of compassion as the only genuine ethical incentive is 
derived purely from a posterori ethical foundations, Schopenhauer also wishes to bring his moral 
thought into harmony with his metaphysical philosophy.  To achieve this goal, Schopenhauer 
offers a short supplement to On the Basis of Morality which he titles “On the Metaphysical 
Explanation of the Primary Ethical Phenomenon.”  Schopenhauer intends the supplement to be 
read as a grounding of his ethical philosophy of compassion, the so-called “primary ethical 
phenomenon,” in his broader transcendental metaphysics; an act of great import, as he remarks, 
“philosophical as well as religious systems agree that the ethical significance of actions must at 
the same time be metaphysical” (BM, 200).  All empirical actions intuitively recognized as good 
or morally praiseworthy must be recognized as such through the “illuminating light of 
metaphysics,” to borrow a phrase that Schopenhauer cites from Christian Wolff (BM, 40).  
Without a metaphysical foundation, all purely a posterori moral philosophy, Schopenhauer 
holds, is susceptible to being critiqued as a hopeless, relative empirical prescription of right and 
wrong.16  Thus, Schopenhauer sets out to explicate a metaphysical basis of morality just as Kant 
did 55 years before him.   
Metaphysical Justification of Schopenhauerian Ethics 
                                                          
16 Recall the quote on page 17: ethical philosophy “consists of a pure, i.e. a priori knowable part and an empirical 
one” (BM, 61).   
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 Schopenhauer’s metaphysical principium individuationis is space and time: only through 
succession in time and juxtoposition in space can numerical diversity arise.  Schopenhauer’s (and 
before him Kant’s) metaphysics and epistemology dictate that space and time are ideal forms of 
intuition.  Plurality is thus only a feature of the phenomenal.  The noumenal, which is the 
underlying essence of all phenomenal representation, is numerically identical within all things.  
Schopenhauer concludes that “if plurality and separateness belong only to the phenomenon, and 
if it is one and the same essence that manifests itself in all living things, then that conception that 
abolishes the difference between ego and non-ego is not erroneous; but on the contrary, the 
opposite conception must be” (BM, 209). 
 To see if “that conception which abolishes the difference between ego and non-ego” is 
erroneous or accurate, we must return to Schopenhauer’s ontological conception of the body.  
The ethical ramifications of our possession of a body that is simultaneously known from within 
and without, in self-consciousness and consciousness of other things, come to light in 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical exegesis of morality.  As Schopenhauer showed in the a posterori 
formulation of his ethical system, actions which we empirically recognize as good are acts of 
compassion, whereby the good man directly participates in the weal and woe of others. 
Schopenhauer further claims that we can recognize that the essential character of the 
compassionate man which motivates his good actions is “that he makes less of a distinction than 
do the rest between himself and others” (BM, 204).  The malicious man, conversely, sees the 
gulf between himself and others as so great that he delights in their woes.  Schopenhauer thus 
turns to metaphysics to see whether this recognition of the identity of the self and the other, the 
recognition which motivates compassion, is philosophically justified or tragically misguided.   
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 When the body is considered purely from without, there is no such metaphysical 
justification for compassion.  Phenomenal experience dictates that the distinction between my 
body and the body of the other is absolute.  The body and its accompanying ego simply are 
atomized and individuated from other bodies and their non-egos when perceived through our 
consciousness of other things.  Were this to be the only way to experience our bodies, egoism, 
not compassion, would be metaphysically justified, insofar as the egoist takes himself to be the 
only object of his ethical action.  The other is so foreign to the egoist who conceives of his body 
only in this way that ethical action towards a non-ego has no justification. 
  Yet Schopenhauer recognizes self-consciousness as another way of knowing our body, 
this time from within.  Our self-consciousness teaches us that the noumenal underpinning of our 
being is forever inaccessible and foreign to us—we may recognize ourselves as phenomenal 
manifestations of the Will, but this is the extent of our essence that self-consciousness can reach.  
As Schopenhauer says, “we only see outward; within it is dark and obscure…the ego knows 
itself only as phenomenon, not according to what it may be in itself” (BM, 206).  Accordingly, 
the egoist is fundamentally misguided.  Even though he possesses a self-consciousness, he 
nevertheless knows himself just as he knows others, that is, as phenomenon.  In our futile 
attempts to look inward and witness our noumenal nature, all that we may see is our phenomenal 
will.  Less we should fall prey to hopeless sophism, Schopenhauer advises that we should draw 
the obvious conclusion that the noumenon which underlies each of our respective phenomenal 
wills is identical and possesses the characteristics of the Will already described.  Taking this 
realization to its logical end, all appearances of phenomenal will, whether they be in animal-life, 
plant-life, or inorganic forces, must be drawn from the same mutual source, the same noumenal 
Will.   
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Schopenhauer summarizes his metaphysical argument in the following way:  
 Individuation is mere phenomenon or appearance and originates through space and time.  
 These are nothing but the forms of all of the objects of my cerebral cognitive faculty and 
 are conditioned by them.  And so even plurality and diversity are mere phenomenon, that 
 is, exist only in my representation.  My true inner being exists in every living thing as 
 directly as it makes itself known in my self-consciousness only to me (BM, 210).   
 
The ethical consequences of this argument are apparent.  Compassion, Schopenhauer’s only true 
ethical incentive to action, is justified by the metaphysical realization of the identical essence of 
both ego and non-egos.  The being of the compassionate man resonates in harmony with the 
being of his external world.  The other to whom I may extend compassion and actively 
participate in his weal and woe is no longer a non-ego, but an “‘I once more’” (BM, 211).  The 
ethical act of compassion is thus reflexive, as much directed towards the self as it is towards the 
other.  Schopenhauer’s conception of ethical action is informed and justified by his metaphysical 
schema.  His injection of the Will into his ethical philosophy also warrants him being labeled a 
proper philosopher of ethics-of-will.  
Schopenhauerian Ethics as Ethics-of-Will 
 From this example of Schopenhauerian ethical thought, a subset of ethical philosophy 
which I call “ethics-of-will” can be extrapolated.  Theories of ethics-of-will may be classified as 
contingent on the metaphysical assumption that the Will is the noumenal thing-in-itself, on the 
ontological assumption that all that exists is a manifestation of this Will, and on the ethical 
assumption that ethical value is derived from properly responding to these specific metaphysical 
and ontological circumstances.  Schopenhauer’s ethical thought is a prime example of moral 
philosophy which meets these criteria.  His metaphysics dictate that the Will is indeed the 
noumenal thing-in-itself and his ontology of all non-living and living things shows that all that 
exists is an objectification of this Will.  His ethics of compassion respond to, and are justified by, 
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these specific metaphysical and ontological circumstances.  Yet Schopenhauer is not the only 
philosopher who advances an ethics-of-will.  Schopenhauer himself draws ties between his own 
ethical philosophy and the philosophy of ancient Vedic scripture in many of his works.  Spinoza 
might be considered a philosopher of ethics-of-will; yet his conception of the Will (God) as the 
essence of the world is so different from Schopenhauer’s conception of the Will that any 
comparison between the two forms of ethics would likely find that it is their differing 
conceptions of the Will itself which, at least in part, is a cause of their differences in moral 
thought.  Nietzsche and Fichte might also fit the criteria of ethics-of-will but, like Spinoza, their 
respective conceptions of the Will as will-to-power and will-to-action make any comparison to 
Schopenhauer primarily a metaphysical distinction.  A much more nuanced comparison, and 
perhaps a comparison that could better get at the heart of the causes of divergence of optimistic 
and pessimistic ethics-of-will, would be one in which the ethics part of ethics-of-will, not the will 
part, is the site of divergence between the philosophers.  For this, we turn to the philosophy of 
Albert Schweitzer.   
 Schweitzer, born fifteen years after Schopenhauer’s death, offers an ethics-of-will while 
simeltaneously breaking with Schopenhauer in his unique ethical prescriptions.  The next section 
of this thesis will be devoted to a comprehensive summary of the foundations and prescriptions 
of Schweitzer’s ethics-of-will.  Once this has been completed, I will begin an investigation into 
the causes of the diversity of ethical prescription between these two philosophers of ethics-of-
will.    
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CHAPTER III 
SCHWEITZER’S ETHICS-OF-WILL 
Elemental Ethics, World-View, and Life- and World-Affirmation 
 If Schopenhauer’s goal is to give an account of the noumenal as it is known through 
immediate intuition and to ground ethics in the empirical and a priori (rather than a purely a 
priori imperative), than it is Schweitzer’s goal to discover an elemental basis for a life- and 
world-affirming “Weltanschauung.”17   Schweitzer contends that his goal is of the utmost 
importance, as only the discovery of such a world-view can cure all of the spiritual and material 
ills which threaten to doom Western civilization.  It is necessary to first define the terminology 
of “elemental,” “world-view,” and “life- and world-affirmation” before the relationship of 
Schweitzer’s ethics to the noumenal can be understood. 
 A philosophical world-view, as Schweitzer conceives of the term in Civilization and 
Ethics (CE), means “the sum-total of the thoughts which the community or the individual think 
about the nature and purpose of the universe and about the place and destiny of mankind within 
the world” (CE, vi).  While Schweitzer does articulate a self-contained metaphysical picture of 
ultimate reality, he boldly claims, again and again, that any genuine world-view cannot be 
constructed on metaphysical foundations.  This is precisely what Schweitzer means when 
employing his term “elemental philosophy.”  A philosophy is properly elemental when it can be 
divorced from all metaphysical and ethical “abstract cosmic speculations” (CE, 163).  Schweitzer 
                                                          
17 I have chosen to use the Campion translation of “Weltanschauung” offered in the Adam & Charles Black (1955) 
3rd English edition of Civilization and Ethics.  In a “Translators Note” on page ix, the translator writes that the 
compound German word “Weltanschauung” may be translated as: “theory of the universe”, which is problematic in 
that it suggests a scientific theory of the universe; “world-theory” or “world-conception”, which are problematic in 
that they suggest Schweitzer is attempting to explain why our human world is the way it is; and “world-view”, 
which the translator deems best in that it “indicates a sufficiently wide knowledge and consideration of our corner of 
the universe to allow all factors to be taken into consideration which bear on the question at issue” (Translator’s 
Note, CE, ix).  Henceforth, when I write of Schweitzer’s Weltanschauung, I shall simply write the English “world-
view.” 
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believes that Western philosophy has failed to produce a palatable world- and life-affirming 
world-view as, historically, 
 our philosophizing became less and less elemental, losing all connection to the 
 elementary questions which man must ask of life and of the world.  More and more it 
 found satisfaction in the handling of philosophical questions that were merely academic, 
 and in expert mastery of philosophical technique.  It became more and more captive to 
 secondary things.  Instead of real music it produced bandmaster’s music, often 
 magnificent of its kind, but still only bandmaster’s music (CE, x).  
 
Schweitzer’s “bandmaster” is the armchair metaphysician concerned with understanding airy and 
abstract speculative concepts, just as Schopenhauer’s a priori moralist conducts abstract 
speculation which is “doubtless admirably adapted for the lecture room” yet fails to recognize 
the requisite empirical foundations of morality (BM, 133).  Schweitzer’s “real” musician is 
analogous to the philosopher who divorces himself from metaphysical assumptions and 
investigates the world as it is elementally, or without the influence of any preconceived 
philosophical notions.   
 Schweitzer praises Schopenhauer not only as his greatest philosophical influence but also 
as a genuine elemental moralist.18  Compared to the ethical writings of Kant which arise out of 
his metaphysical discovery of the synthetic a priori, Schopenhauer “pursue[s] no abstract cosmic 
speculations”; his ethics are “an experience of the will-to-live” (CE, 163).  For Schopenhauer to 
claim that an ethical system “requires little reflection and even less abstraction” is akin to 
Schweitzer requiring that ethics “must not lapse into abstract thinking, but remain elemental” 
(CE, 240).  An ethics which “independently of the formation of the intellect, speaks to every 
                                                          
18 As Goodin notes, a reference to Schopenhauer as Schweitzer’s primary influence does not exist in his published 
texts. However, in private correspondence between Schweitzer and his friend Jackson Lee Ice, Schweitzer responds 
to Ice’s question concerning his philosophical influences with only one name, where he writes “―I felt, even at the 
age of eighteen, that Schopenhauer’s work ... was an event for me.”  David K. Goodin, “Albert Schweitzer's 
Reverence for Life ethic in relation to Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche” PhD diss., McGill University, 
2011. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing (NR77503).  
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man” is also an ethics which resonates with Schweitzer’s “unlearned man who, at the sight of a 
tree in flower, is overpowered by the mystery of the will-to-live which is stirring all round him” 
and thus “knows more than the scientist who studies under the microscope…a thousand forms of 
the will-to-live, but…is unmoved by the mystery that everything that exists is will-to-live” (CE, 
241).  The ethical system which rests “merely on intuitive apprehension” and forces itself 
“immediately on us out of the reality of things” may rightfully be called an ethical system which 
springs from “the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness” in which “day by 
day, hour by hour, I live and move” (CE, 242). 
 Schweitzer also recognizes Schopenhauer as “the first representative in Western thought 
of a consistent world- and life-denying system of ethics” (CE, 164).  While Schweitzer clearly 
appreciates the novelty of Schopenhauer’s world- and life-denying world-view, Schweitzer 
himself attempts to discover an elemental world- and life-affirming world-view.  World- and 
life-affirmation is defined in a “Reviser’s Note” to Civilization and Ethics as the “conviction that 
life is a real thing, that the world in itself and life in itself have great value, that life is for each 
individual infinitely worthwhile, that the human spirit can dominate nature, and that man must 
never admit defeatism” (CE, vii).  The obverse is true of world- and life-denial,19 exemplified in 
the world-view professed by Schopenhauer.   
 Schweitzer contends that he has met his goal of discovering a world-view which meets 
the two necessary conditions of being elemental and supporting world- and life-affirmation.  His 
discovery is that genuine ethical action, and, indeed, all philosophy, begins with the recognition 
of “the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness,” the mantra which is the 
elemental kernel of his ethical system: “I am life that wills to live, in the midst of life that wills 
                                                          
19 Also called “world- and life-negation” by Schweitzer. 
28 
 
to live” (CE, 242).  It is the ethical system springing from this elementary mantra which 
Schweitzer calls “Reverence for Life.”  
 One acts in accordance with the ethics of Reverence for Life when one is thoughtfully 
“experiencing the compulsion to show all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my own" 
(CE, 242).  Schweitzer gives numerous examples of this form of ethics which may be simply put 
as “responsibility without limit towards all that lives" (CE, 244).  Schweitzer writes that the 
ethical man will never pluck a flower from its stalk nor a leaf from its tree.  He will always take 
great care to not step on helpless insects or to return the earthworm withering on a sunny 
sidewalk to its soil.  He should never feel shame for being mocked as sentimental for spending 
his nights in a hot, stuffy room rather than opening a window and allowing for some unfortunate 
moth to be zapped by his lamp (CE, 243).  Schweitzer thus contends that “a man is truly ethical 
only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist and shrinks from 
injuring anything that lives” (CE, 243).  Just as Schopenhauer contends that compassion, his only 
genuine ethical incentive, involves the active involvement of the ethical subject in the weal and 
woe of the other’s will, so too does Reverence for Life “include also feeling as one's own all the 
circumstances and all the aspirations of the will-to-live, its pleasure, too, and its longing to live 
itself out to the full, as well as its urge to self-perfecting" (CE, 244).  While the details of 
Reverence for Life are important, the primary matter at hand is for us to understand the relation 
of Reverence for Life to the noumenal Will and thus see if Reverence for Life corresponds to 
Schopenhauer’s ethics as a form of ethics-of-will.  It is now necessary for us to untangle the 
knotted relationship between Schweitzer’s conception of world-view, metaphysics, and ethics so 
that we may see if Reverence for Life is a genuine form of ethics-of-will. 
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World-View, Ethics, and Metaphysics: Untangling Schweitzer’s Borromean Knot 
 So far, we have seen that Schweitzer seeks to discover an elemental world-view, or a 
conception of the meaning of man and the universe which is based on the answers to elementary 
philosophical questions, not an ethical or metaphysical foundation.  One may well assume that 
the world-view reached through Reverence for Life must not be an ethics-of-will, in that the 
Will, as I have previously described it, appears to fall strictly under the domain of metaphysics.  
Through untangling the knotted relationship between Schweitzer’s conceptions of metaphysics, 
ethics, and world-view, the status of Reverence for Life as an ethics-of-will shall become 
apparent.   
Schweitzer’s metaphysical conception of ultimate reality is identical to Schopenhauer’s view 
of the noumenal thing-in-itself.  Both contend that the noumenal thing-in-itself is the Will, 
though Schweitzer uses the term “will-to-live.”  This terminological distinction, however, should 
not prevent us from seeing that they are talking about the same thing.  Schopenhauer himself 
writes that “as what the will wills is always life … it is immaterial and a mere pleonasm if, 
instead of simply saying ‘the will,’ we say ‘the will-to-live’” (WWRI, 275).  It is also evident 
that Schweitzer equates the terms “Will” and “will-to-live” as he writes that Schopenhauer 
“defines the essence of things in themselves, which is to be accepted as underlying all 
phenomena, to be Will, not, however, like Fichte, as will to action, but more directly and more 
correctly, as will-to-live” (CE, 164-165).  Though it may seem easy to infer from this 
metaphysical conception of will-to-live the elemental kernel of Schweitzer’s world-view (that is, 
“I am life that wills to live, in the midst of life that wills to live”), the relationship between 
Schweitzer’s metaphysics and his world-view is actually inverted: our search for a world-view 
will not “search for a ‘metaphysic,’ thinking by means of it to reach a world-view, but it will 
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search for a world-view and accept with it anything ‘metaphysical’ that may turn up” (CE, 242, 
73).  
  Schweitzer claims that his metaphysical conception of the Will “turns up” from the 
discovery of his elemental world-view.  As previously stated, the recognition of oneself as will-
to-live in the midst of will-to-live is the “most immediate and comprehensive fact of 
consciousness” (CE, 242).  It requires no metaphysical or ethical narrative underlying it and is 
therefore elemental.  It simply appears to the thinking subject once all metaphysical and ethical 
presuppositions have been removed and the subject can think genuinely.  Schweitzer himself 
compares this elemental revelation to Descartes’s “cogito ergo sum,” though he claims that 
Descartes’s elemental starting point is an “arbitrarily chosen beginning” which “is landed 
irretrievably on the road to the abstract” (CE, 242).  His elemental starting point is one that is 
lived and felt at every moment, not through abstract rational thought, but through the immediate 
and continuous experience of oneself as will-to-live.   
 Concerning ethics, Schweitzer holds that “the origin of ethics is that I think out the full 
meaning of the world-affirmation which, together with the life-affirmation in my will-to-live, is 
given by nature, and try to make it a reality” (CE, 240).  Ethics for Schweitzer is thus a strictly 
practical philosophy, a philosophy of action.  Only after the elemental world-view has been 
realized in thought by the subject can the subject begin to act ethically.  Hence, when I write of 
Schweitzer’s ethics, I am writing of a type of thought which follows from the revelation of his 
elemental world-view, like his metaphysics, which, unlike his metaphysics, is brought into the 
realm of practical action.  
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 Schweitzer’s philosophy functions like a Borromean Knot,20 whereby each “ring” of his 
philosophy (world-view, metaphysics, ethics), by virtue of their interconnectedness, form a 
unified whole.  One cannot be separated from the others and each ring strengthens and reinforces 
the whole.  The unique structure of Schweitzer’s philosophy needn’t make us hesitate in 
recognizing that he endorses an ethics-of-will.  Just because his metaphysical picture of ultimate 
reality (noumenal Will) arises as a result of his elemental world-view does not mean that their 
relation should be disregarded as contingent, unimportant, or unessential to his prescriptive 
ethics.  As I have already argued, Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion can be reached without 
any reference to a priori metaphysics, though it need not be.  The great explanatory power of the 
two ethical theories and the reason the insights reached by the theories are so profound lies 
precisely in their relation to their respective metaphysical counterparts which, while perhaps 
secondary to or theoretically separable from the ethics, are nonetheless intimately tied together.  
Just as the “illuminating light of metaphysics” gives Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion a pure 
a priori foundation to accompany his empirical foundation, so too does Schweitzer’s 
metaphysical conception of noumenal Will function holistically with his elemental philosophy of 
Reverence for Life (BM, 40).  Indeed, without the relation of the metaphysical Will to their 
ethics, their ethics would not be ethics-of-will at all, but something entirely different.  Yet this is 
not the case; they both conceive of the metaphysical Will and claim it underlies all phenomena, 
while advocating ethics responding to these specific philosophical circumstances.          
 It is now clear that the respective ethical theories of Schopenhauer and Schweitzer are 
two forms of ethics-of-will.  Now it is our task to see how and why Schopenhauer prescribes 
                                                          
20 A knot of three interconnected rings, originating from the coat of arms of the aristocratic Italian family Borromeo.  
Each ring is linked with the other two, such that the rings are impossible to separate without cutting them and 
unraveling the entire knot.  
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ethical action which results in an extreme life- and world-negation, the preeminent pessimistic 
philosophy in the Western canon, while Schweitzer prescribes ethical action which promotes 
life- and world-affirmation, completing his desired task of formulating a genuinely optimistic 
philosophy.     
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CHAPTER IV 
AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 
 So far, I have suggested that Schopenhauer and Schweitzer are the unmatched exemplars 
of two forms of ethics-of-will which stand in radical opposition to one another: the respective 
form of ethics which promotes world- and life-negation and the form of ethics which promotes 
world- and life- affirmation.  But what exactly do I mean by “affirmation” and “negation” and 
how are these attributions which I place on the two ethics-of-will grounded?  The two come from 
Schweitzer and I use he does.21  In the previous chapter, I noted that world- and life-affirmation 
is based on the premises: “that life is a real thing, that the world in itself and life in itself have 
great value, that life is for each individual infinitely worthwhile, that the human spirit can 
dominate nature, and that man must never admit defeatism” (CE, vii).  In opposition to 
Schopenhauer, Schweitzer hopes to promote ethical thought which “must lead us from the naïve 
to a deepened world- and life-affirmation” (CE, 209).  The “deepened” world- and life-
affirmation, whose achievement is Schweitzer’s ultimate philosophical goal “consists in this: that 
we have the will to maintain our own life and every kind of existence that we can in any way 
influence, and to bring them to their highest value” (CE, 209).  To advance world- and life-
affirmation, we, as ethical subjects must “think out all ideals of the material and spiritual 
perfecting of individual men, of society, and of mankind as a whole, and let ourselves be 
determined by them to steady activity and constant hope” (CE, 209).  “The burden which deeper 
world- and life-affirmation lays upon us” is the weight of having to actively, interestedly 
participate in the world when it might bring us peace to simply withdraw into ourselves (CE, 
209). 
                                                          
21 Schopenhauer instead uses the longer synonyms “affirmation of the will” and “denial of the will,” which appear 
most frequently in “Book Four” of the World as Will and Representation (WWRI, 261-412). 
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 The meaning of life, as prescribed in Schopenhauer’s ethics, is to escape the wretched 
world-process and human suffering through three possible routes: resignation, pity, and world-
renunciation, all of which are acts of compassion.  Each of these three ethical prescriptions act as 
means to achieve world- and life-negation.  In engaging in these ethical actions, the subject 
participates in the quieting of his own will and the quenching of its demand to live.  Simply to 
escape the brutal world-process through resigning oneself to momentary aesthetic contemplation, 
like “losing oneself” in a piece of art or in the beauty of a sunset, is compassionate in that the 
ethical actor temporarily removes himself from the autocannibalistic violence of the Will.  To act 
with moral awareness and pity others is compassionate in that the alleviation of the woe of the 
other becomes the focus of all action.  To renounce the world and commit oneself to a life of 
ascetic wasting-away exemplifies compassion in that the ascetic does not prey on other 
manifestations of the Will for nourishment.  Together, these ethical prescriptions comprise a 
system of ethics which promotes world- and life-negation, insofar as world- and life-negation is 
seen as man’s inner-ethical conviction that “life is an illusion, that nothing really matters because 
all is vanity, that the individual in his short span of life can achieve nothing of value, that the 
supreme good is to make an end of it” (CE, vii).   
 Reality, beyond the kaleidoscopic illusions of beings like ourselves who see the world as 
diverse and distinct representations, is, for both Schopenhauer and Schweitzer, pure Will.  Both 
philosophers too cannot help but understand this Will as mindless, endless, and self-consuming, 
in that the Will, once perceived, appears as distinct entities, each driven by the will-to-live, who 
find themselves in constant competition for survival.  Given this horrifying picture of the world, 
both philosophers must also come to terms with the pessimistic ramifications of a Will which at 
once seeks only to continue living but must do so through preying on other representations of the 
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Will.  We must view world- and life-affirmation in relation to optimism and world- and life-
negation in relation to pessimism, as each philosopher’s ethics-of-will belongs to one of these 
two tendencies.    
 In reading Schweitzer’s chapter on Schopenhauer in Civilization and Ethics, one is 
tempted to imagine Schweitzer, with the theatrical conviction of a J’Accuse!, leveling the 
damning title “pessimist” on Schopenhauer.  It is obvious that Schopenhauer has been ritually 
upheld by academics as the preeminent philosophical pessimist, but on what grounds?  For 
Schweitzer, the pessimist is marked by his devotion to a system of ethics which promotes world- 
and life-negation.  Schopenhauer himself seldom uses the word “pessimism” in his published 
works and only once uses the term to refer to his own philosophy.  In a footnote in Manuscript 
Remains, Schopenhauer writes that “my doctrine is pessimism” in contrast to philosophical 
pantheism, which he saw as necessarily optimistic through its contention that the world is divine 
and praiseworthy.22  The fact that Schopenhauer is hesitant to call himself a pessimist should not 
compel us to claim that his philosophy is not pessimistic, inasmuch as pessimistic philosophy 
views the world as the nexus of suffering which must be overcome.  Human existence, for the 
philosophical pessimist “must contain suffering, and cannot be preferable to non-existence”; 
compared to the current state of affairs, it would have been far better for reality to have never 
existed.23  Where the nihilist might claim that “there is no meaning in life,” and the sceptic might 
claim that “there may be meaning to life, but I could never know it,” the pessimistic philosopher 
claims that life and the world-process are imbued with meaning, but this meaning of the world-
process is to suffer and the meaning of life is to escape this suffering.  In Schopenhauerian 
philosophy, this is precisely the case.  The world-process is the gradual unfolding of an endlessly 
                                                          
22 Cartwright, Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, 125.  
23 Janaway, Christopher, Schopenhauer (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 86. 
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striving, autocannibalistic, self-consuming Will.  All human life, as a manifest representation of 
the Will, is suffering, as simply to will is to suffer; willing cannot begin from a place of 
contentment but must arise as directed toward an object which one is lacking; when one desire is 
reached through willing its appeasement, another desire soon replaces it, if it does not, one 
suffers in boredom.24  These are the characteristic markings of a pessimistic ethical philosophy, 
thus positioning Schopenhauer’s ethics-of-will as archetypically pessimistic.   
 Schweitzer too must come to terms with pessimism.  When one is born into this world, all 
that one knows is pure life-affirmation, the innate desire to continue living and flourish.  Once 
one begins to think about the world he inhabits and the role he plays in it, one’s eyes are opened 
to the spectacle of suffering taking place all around him.  It is at this stage, for Schweitzer, that 
pessimism takes hold of the thinking subject.  While Schopenhauer remains consistently 
grounded in this pessimism, Schweitzer hopes to rediscover the innate, elemental grounds of life-
affirmation from which an ethics of optimism might itself flourish.  In returning to the elemental 
basis of viewing one’s own self as will-to-live which seeks only life-affirmation, Schweitzer 
positions himself as an optimist and prescribes ethical action accordingly.  
 I invite the reader to imagine that entire subset of ethical thought which I have designated 
as ethics-of-will as an ordinary metal coin.  One side of the coin is Schweitzer’s Reverence for 
Life ethic, the most extreme optimistic, world- and life-affirming form of ethics-of-will.  On the 
inverse side of the coin is Schopenhauer’s ethical system; etched in the metal is the most 
pessimistic, world- and life-denying form of ethics-of-will thus far articulated in philosophy.  If 
one side is corroded away, that same side still exists, the whole coin has only become thinner.  If 
Schweitzer’s side of the coin is corroded away, beneath it will appear a Nietzsche, Fichte, or 
                                                          
24 Janaway, Schopenhauer, 86-7. 
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Spinoza which takes its place, thus determining the world- and life-affirming extreme of ethics-
of-will.  If we were to scrape away the etchings in Schopenhauer’s side of the coin, we would 
still find multiple layers of Indian pessimistic thought underneath.  Yet, as it currently stands, 
Schweitzer and Schopenhauer determine the two extremes, the two sides of the same coin. 
 Like two sides of any coin, the two forms of ethics-of-will can never meet.  They are 
condemned to forever exist in radical opposition.  Bend the coin so that the two should meet, and 
surely it will break.  The nature of this oppositional relationship between the two forms of ethics-
of-will shall be the subject of the remainder of this thesis.  I hope to make clear exactly how the 
optimism of Schweitzerian ethics-of-will and the pessimism of Schopenhauerian ethics-of-will 
arose in their respective works, despite the two philosophers’ identical metaphysical and 
ontological conceptions of Will and strikingly similar conceptions of ethical actions as motivated 
by Reverence for Life or compassion.  In order to do so, I look to the two philosophers’ 
respective methodologies and their individual perspectives on the will-to-live in order to situate 
their ethical thought within their broader philosophical thought and see if these methodological 
and philosophical distinctions might explain their radical opposition in ethical prescriptions.     
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CHAPTER V 
THE CAUSE OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN SCHIOPENHAUERIAN PESSIMISM AND 
SCHWEITZERIAN OPTIMISM  
The ex post facto/ex ante facto Distinction 
 The respective motivations of our two examples of ethics-of-will appear to harmonize 
with each other in that both are attempting to promote a certain synthesis.  This synthesis is, in 
each case, the ethical synthesis of the subject with the other which arises as a result of an 
metaphysical synthesis of the ego with the non-ego; the object of the subject’s ethical action (the 
other) is synthesized with the subject once that object is recognized to be not another, distinctly 
existing being, but an “I once more” (BM, 211).  In Schopenhauer’s ethics, this ethical synthesis 
is derived from the metaphysical justification of compassion, his singular moral incentive.  As 
for Schweitzer, the ethical synthesis essentially is his Reverence for Life, in which the subject 
attempts to promote the wellbeing of all life just as he attempts to promote his own.  The two 
diverge, however, as Schweitzer’s synthesis of the ego and non-ego occurs at the very elemental 
starting point of his philosophy, whereas Schopenhauer must generate the synthesis through an 
arduous philosophical project which can be entirely divorced from his ethics.    
 Schweitzer takes his philosophy to begin with the mantra “I am life that wills to live, in 
the midst of life that wills to live” (CE, 242).  This is his elemental world-view, and the ethics 
and metaphysics which “turn up” from it constitute the remainder of Schweitzer’s philosophy.  It 
is critical to note, then, that from the very beginning of Schweitzer’s philosophy, the 
metaphysical synthesis between ego and non-ego has already occurred.  All existing life, whether 
it be the self or the non-self, shares metaphysical identity as the self-same will-to-live.  His ethics 
arise as an ex post facto inquiry into the ethical ramifications of the synthesis.  As an avowed 
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“elemental” moralist, Schweitzer claims that the recognition of his mantra and his Reverence for 
Life ethics that follow from it are in no way founded upon philosophical abstractions.  Yet here 
we see something like a philosophical abstraction, even if Schweitzer refuses to phrase it as such.  
He may claim that the recognition that one is “life that wills to live, in the midst of life that wills 
to live” is in fact the product of pure, elemental experience (“the most immediate and 
comprehensive fact of consciousness”), while critics may claim that this very postulation upon 
which Reverence for Life is constructed is a philosophical assumption just like any other (CE, 
242).  Instead of playing these semantic games, I wish only to emphasize that the synthesis of 
ego and non-ego occurs at the elemental starting point of Reverence for Life. 
 Given his particular historical circumstances, Schopenhauer is not afforded the luxury of 
immediately assuming the synthesis of ego and non-ego and generating an ethics in the wake of 
that assumption.  As a philosophy which posited the metaphysical identity of the subject and the 
object had not yet been generated under the Transcendental Idealist framework, Schopenhauer 
had to be the first.  In On the Basis of Morality, Schopenhauer takes great care to show that his 
ethics need not be contingent on his metaphysics, that the two are separable but holistically 
compatible.   One could read Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion as coming before his 
metaphysics and thus ex ante facto of the synthesis between ego and non-ego.  Indeed, this is 
how Schopenhauer himself structured On the Basis of Morality: first, there is an a posteriori 
discovery of the foundations of morality; then there is the discovery of compassion as the 
genuine moral incentive which rests on these a posteriori foundations; finally, there is a 
metaphysical justification for compassion arising from the synthesis of the ego and non-ego.  It is 
only after Schopenhauer has shown the metaphysical viability of this synthesis that he returns to 
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his ethics, justifying his ethics of compassion by presenting the metaphysical identity of ego and 
non-ego.   
 The point here is not that the two forms of ethics delivered in Schweitzer’s chapter 
“Reverence for Life” and the first half of Schopenhauer’s On the Basis of Morality are radically 
different because of this ex post facto/ex ante facto methodological distinction, but, more 
surprisingly, the point is that they are very much the same.  Before Schopenhauer colors his 
ethical philosophy with metaphysical considerations (i.e., the identity of the ego and non-ego), 
his only ethical virtue (compassion) functions in precisely the same way Reverence for Life does 
in promoting the ethical act.  Similar too are their requirements for an ethical system divorced 
from any other philosophical considerations (i.e., elemental, an immediate fact of 
consciousness).  Upon these purely elemental foundations, Schopenhauer advocates for the 
compassionate participation in the weal and woe of the other, just as Schweitzer’s Reverence for 
Life is focused on promoting the flourishing and alleviating the suffering of the other.  Once 
Schopenhauer introduces the metaphysical synthesis of the ego and non-ego after his a posteriori 
discovery of compassion, the metaphysical nature of the Will (into which the ego and non-ego 
are synthesized) gives Schopenhauer’s prescriptive ethics their characteristically pessimistic 
disposition.  Schweitzer’s synthesis of the ego and the non-ego occurs at the very outset of his 
philosophy, and thus his Reverence for Life form of ethics-of-will arises ex post facto relative to 
this synthesis.  Before Schopenhauer introduces the synthesis of ego and non-ego in his 
metaphysical justification for compassion, the moral incentive of compassion has essentially the 
same ethical ends as Reverence for Life: active participation in the weal (flourishing) and woe 
(suffering) of the other and using this active participation to spur ethical action.  Considering 
Reverence of Life after the synthesis of ego and non-ego and ethics of compassion before the 
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synthesis of ego and non-ego, the two appear identical; however, to call this ethics of 
compassion a form of ethics-of-will is clearly incorrect.  Schopenhauer’s ethics become an 
ethics-of-will once the ego and non-ego have been synthesized into the Will.  Only at that point 
do Schopenhauer’s ethical prescriptions radically diverge from Schweitzer’s ethical 
prescriptions.   
 We now see that Schopenhauer and Schweitzer advocate essentially the same ethical 
prescriptions until Schopenhauer introduces the metaphysical Will as justification for his ethics 
and thus properly makes his ethics and ethics-of-will.  Yet how is it that the introduction of Will 
into Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion motivates his pessimistic world- and life-denial?  It is 
clear that Schopenhauer and Schweitzer have identical conceptions of the violent, 
autocannibalistic, restlessly striving Will, yet Schweitzer responds to the violence of the Will in a 
radically different way than Schopenhauer.  The answer to this riddle lies in the different 
perspectives the two philosophers take on the will-to-live.   
Perspectives on the Will-to-Live 
 Schopenhauer’s ethics move from being a purely a posteriori recognition of weal and 
woe as the guiding force behind human action to become true ethics-of-will with the addition of 
a synthesis of ego and non-ego into one universal Will.  This is achieved through an 
introspective look at the body and the individual’s phenomenal will, from which, lest 
Schopenhauer should fall into solipsism, must be the same essence of all things.  This realization 
at once justifies compassion, but also opens up the thinking subject to pessimism as the violent 
suffering the Will inflicts upon itself becomes apparent.  Pessimism teaches that the Will itself is 
a violent and evil world-process and should be escaped.  In order to achieve this escape, 
Schopenhauer uses his ethics to promote world- and life-negation.  Aesthetic appreciation, pity, 
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and ascetism all function as compassionate ethical acts which seek to negate both life and, 
ultimately, the world as Will.   
 Of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Schweitzer writes that his ethics-of-will (as I have 
described them) are not technically ethics but “supra-ethics:” moral teachings which are used as 
means to Schopenhauer’s ultimate ethical end, world and life-negation.  I contend that this is a 
fair designation for Schopenhauer’s ethics.  Compassion, though Schopenhauer claims it is the 
only genuine moral incentive, is nevertheless only an incentive.  What each part of the 
Schopenhauerian ethical triad seeks to advance is pure world- and life-negation, and each part is 
only morally praiseworthy insofar as it advances this end.  What we find in Schweitzer’s ethics-
of-will is quite different.   
 Schweitzer begins with the elemental realization that “I am will to live in the midst of 
will to live” (CE, 242).  From this immediate and most intuitive fact of which he can conceive, 
Schweitzer finds himself face to face with pessimism: “the beauty of nature is darkened by the 
suffering they discover everywhere within it” (CE, 281).  At this point, Schweitzer could very 
well do as Schopenhauer does and use the violence and suffering of nature everywhere so 
perceptible as evidence for the claim that the world and life must be negated into nothingness.  
Against this pessimistic temptation, Schweitzer looks back to the direct experience each being 
has of its will-to-live and sees only a desire to continue living and flourish to the greatest extent 
possible.  It is on this basis that he advocates philosophical optimism, though pessimism can 
never truly be done away with, only temporarily stifled, as “does pessimistic knowledge pursue 
us closely right on to our last breath” (CE, 285).  Reverence for Life is thus an ethic which arises 
out of Schweitzer’s first elemental revelation that comes from his direct experience with himself 
as will-to-live which seeks only life-affirmation.   
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 Perhaps, then, the fault line between these two philosophers’ ethics-of-will lies between 
using one’s own direct experience of the will-to-live as motivation for ethical action and using 
the experiences of entire world’s collective will-to-live as motivation for ethical action.  The 
will-to-live, as it is felt directly by both Schweitzer and Schopenhauer, seeks only life-
affirmation.  Even in the greatest moments of suffering, the will-to-live always desires to 
continue to live and flourish.  Any notion of a drive towards death is foreign to the will-to-live of 
Schweitzer and Schopenhauer; death and suffering only arise as the drive towards life-
affirmation of one manifestation of the Will comes into conflict with the life-affirmation of 
another manifestation.  Schopenhauer, in this pessimistic vision of the world, can only see this 
collective world-process as hopelessly violent and advocates a supra-ethics-of-will which 
attempts to reach his final ethical prescription of world- and life-negation.  Schweitzer weathers 
the storm of pessimism and returns to the direct experience of the will-to-live, an experience that 
consists only of life-affirmation, and advocates a world- and life-affirming ethics-of-will on that 
foundation.            
 The two philosophers, then, have identical conceptions of ultimate metaphysical reality 
as the Will, share the ontological belief that all that exists (from the perspective of human 
consciousness) is mere representation of this Will, and advocate ethical action on the basis of 
these metaphysical and ontological premises.  As such, their ethical systems are ethics-of-will.  
The contradictory nature of their ethical prescriptions arises not from any underlying 
metaphysical difference, but merely from their individual perspectives on the will-to-live.  
Schopenhauer views the Will from a global perspective, in which the whole host of objectified 
wills-to-live, who each seek only life, are thrown into bloody combat with each other for 
survival.  The incredible amount of suffering so apparent from this global perspective can only 
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lead Schopenhauer to become a pessimist.  This pessimism motivates his ethical end of world- 
and life-negation, and he advocates ethical behavior which seeks to reach this end.  The 
difference between Schopenhauer and Schweitzer’s respective ethics-of-will arises as 
Schweitzer, contrary to Schopenhauer, takes a local perspective on the will-to-live.  
Schopenhauer’s will-to-live places the suffering of the whole world under his ethical lens, but, as 
Schweitzer writes, “the will-to-live which tries to know the world is a shipwrecked castaway; the 
will-to-live which gets to know itself is a bold mariner” (CE, 281).  Schweitzer clings to the most 
elemental fact of consciousness, that what his will-to-live seeks is only life-affirmation.  From 
this localized focus on his own will-to-live, Schweitzer advances a world and life-affirming 
ethics-of-will.   
 This explanation of the division between the two philosopher’s prescriptive ethics makes 
sense in light of the ex post facto/ex ante facto distinction described earlier.  Before 
Schopenhauer introduces the concept of the Will into his ethics (thus making his ethics an ethics-
of-will) there is nothing within his moral concept of compassion which warrants the label 
“pessimist.”  However, with the addition of a metaphysical justification of his ethics of 
compassion, the Will, into which the subject and the other are synthesized, brings along with it a 
metaphysical picture of violence and suffering.  This picture of the Will, viewed from a global 
perspective, is the image which Schopenhauer’s moral theory seeks to address.  Schopenhauer’s 
ethics of compassion, now accompanied by a metaphysical conception of the Will, are directed 
towards alleviating the suffering of the world through ethical action focused at negating the 
world and life.  Schweitzer, whose ethics arise after one has already recognized that all life is 
will-to-live and thus the ethical subject and its object share metaphysical identity, also must 
embrace or reject the pessimism Schopenhauer faces.  He looks back at the will-to-live from a 
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localized perspective, as his own will-to-live, and finds only life-affirmation.  One perspective on 
the Will makes Schopenhauer a pessimist, another motivates Schweitzer’s optimism.  From these 
two perspectives on the Will, both as it is understood in the individual as that which seeks only 
life-affirmation and as it is perceived in the world as a spectacle of horrific violence and 
suffering, the philosophers’ advance ethics-of-will to meet their respective ends of life- and 
world-affirmation and life- and world-negation.  It is from a point of perspective on the will-to-
live that their ethics-of-will diverge.          
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 Are we to be surprised that the Will, which blindly endeavors to affirm its life while also, 
in its blindness, consuming itself and causing the suffering of its representations, should inspire 
such a broad range of ethical prescriptions?  I think not.  What may be surprising is that it is 
merely a difference in perspective on the Will, and perspective alone, that leads to the divergence 
of Schopenhauerian and Schweitzerian ethics.  The Will viewed from the perspective of the 
individual will-to-live serves as the elemental basis of Schweitzerian ethics; the Will viewed 
from the perspective of the totality of individual wills-to-live which make up the world is that 
which Schopenhauerian ethics hope to negate.  Both philosophers understand the Will from both 
perspectives yet advocate ethics on the basis of only one.            
 Naturally, there are a number of philosophical differences between Schopenhauer and 
Schweitzer that this thesis has intentionally chosen to neglect.  They have, for example, differing 
philosophical conceptions of history, civilization, and science; Schopenhauer is noted for his 
atheism while Schweitzer practiced an unorthodox form of Christianity.  Yet none of these 
philosophical differences get at the heart of the issue.  They are, for the topic at hand, extraneous 
differences which cannot explain the divergence between Schopenhauerian pessimistic ethics-of-
will and Schweitzerian optimistic ethics-of-will.  Indeed, these other variations in philosophical 
thought may arise from the key difference that accounts for the divergent path of their ethical 
prescriptions (that is, their unique perspectives on the will-to-live); though, as both philosophers 
offer ethics-of-will which are marked by their elemental origins, they cannot truly account for 
the initial divergence.        
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 In tracing Schopenhauerian metaphysical terminology to their Kantian origins in 
“Chapter I,” I began this thesis by elucidating Schopenhauer’s metaphysics.  After this had been 
completed, I looked to Schopenhauer’s ethical philosophy in “Chapter II,” first through his 
critique of the Kantian foundations of morality, then through understanding Schopenhauer’s own 
foundations.  I further argued that the injection of the metaphysical Will into Schopenhauer’s 
moral thought makes his ethics an example of ethics-of-will.  In “Chapter III,” I also describe 
Schweitzer’s ethical system as a form of ethics-of-will, only after describing Schweitzerian 
terminology and the philosopher’s unique, knotted conception of ethics, metaphysics, and world-
view.  “Chapter IV” is centered on my description of Schopenhauerian ethical philosophy as 
pessimistic and concerned with world- and life-negation, which radically contrasts with 
Schweitzerian ethical philosophy which is optimistic and world- and life-affirming.  Finally, in 
“Chapter V,” I pinpoint the place of divergence between the two ethics-of-will: Schopenhauer 
takes a global perspective on the will-to-live while Schweitzer takes the local perspective of his 
own will-to-live.  This explanation of their divergence explains why it is that the two sets of 
ethics-of-will only diverge after Schopenhauer has given his ethics a metaphysical foundation 
and made his moral philosophy a proper ethics-of-will. 
 In this thesis, I have explained the moral philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer and Albert 
Schweitzer and discovered the point of divergence between Schopenhauerian pessimistic ethics-
of-will and Schweitzerian optimistic ethics-of-will.  In doing so, I have shined an investigative 
light on the subset of moral thought called ethics-of-will.  Whether the finding that divergent 
perspectives on the will-to-live lead to divergent prescriptive ethics-of-will is applicable to 
comparisons between every form of ethics-of-will seems unlikely.  Other forms of moral 
philosophy which might be categorized as an ethics-of-will may have differing conceptions of 
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the metaphysical nature of the Will which could complicate a comparison of purely ethical 
differences.  Yet, in this thesis, I have shown that perspective on the will-to-live is an essential 
part of the two theories ethics-of-will considered.  Although another philosopher may advocate 
moral thought that meets the criteria of ethics-of-will, yet, in doing so, conceives of the Will in a 
fundamentally different way than Schweitzer or Schopenhauer, a comprehensive critique of such 
thought must not neglect the vital role of the philosopher’s perspective on the will-to-live.            
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